Evolutionary dynamics of the cryptocurrency market by ElBahrawy, Abeer et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
05
33
4v
3 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
1 N
ov
 20
17
Evolutionary dynamics of the cryptocurrency market
Abeer ElBahrawya, Laura Alessandrettia, Anne Kandlerb, Romualdo Pastor-Satorrasc,
and Andrea Baronchellia,d,*
aDepartment of Mathematics - City, University of London - Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK
bMax Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Department of Human Behavior, Ecology and Culture,
Leipzig, Germany
cDepartament de F´ısica, Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya, Campus Nord B4, 08034 Barcelona, Spain
dUCL Centre for Blockchain Technologies, University College London, UK
∗Corresponding author: Andrea.Baronchelli.1@city.ac.uk
Abstract
The cryptocurrency market surpassed the barrier of $100 billion market capitalization in June
2017, after months of steady growth. Despite its increasing relevance in the financial world, however,
a comprehensive analysis of the whole system is still lacking, as most studies have focused exclusively
on the behaviour of one (Bitcoin) or few cryptocurrencies. Here, we consider the history of the en-
tire market and analyse the behaviour of 1, 469 cryptocurrencies introduced between April 2013 and
June 2017. We reveal that, while new cryptocurrencies appear and disappear continuously and their
market capitalization is increasing (super-) exponentially, several statistical properties of the market
have been stable for years. These include the number of active cryptocurrencies, the market share
distribution and the turnover of cryptocurrencies. Adopting an ecological perspective, we show that
the so-called neutral model of evolution is able to reproduce a number of key empirical observations,
despite its simplicity and the assumption of no selective advantage of one cryptocurrency over an-
other. Our results shed light on the properties of the cryptocurrency market and establish a first
formal link between ecological modelling and the study of this growing system. We anticipate they
will spark further research in this direction.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a digital asset designed to work as a medium of exchange [1, 2]. Users can send and receive
native tokens - the “bitcoins” - while collectively validating the transactions in a decentralized and
transparent way. The underlying technology is based on a public ledger - or blockchain - shared between
participants and a reward mechanism in terms of bitcoins as an incentive for users to run the transaction
network. It relies on cryptography to secure the transactions and to control the creation of additional
units of the currency, hence the name of “cryptocurrency” [3, 4].
After Bitcoin appeared in 2009, approximately 1, 500 other cryptocurrencies have been introduced,
around 600 of which are actively traded today. All cryptocurrencies share the underlying blockchain
technology and reward mechanism, but they typically live on isolated transaction networks. Many of them
are basically clones of Bitcoin, although with different parameters such as different supplies, transaction
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validation times, etc. Others have emerged from more significant innovations of the underlying blockchain
technology [5] (see A.3).
Cryptocurrencies are nowadays used both as media of exchange for daily payments, the primary
reason for which Bitcoin was introduced, and for speculation [6, 7]. Other uses include payment rail
for non-expensive cross borders money transfer and various non-monetary uses such as time-stamping
[2]. The self-organization of different usages both within a single cryptocurrency and as an element of
differentiation between cryptocurrencies makes the market of cryptocurrencies unique, and their price
extremely volatile [8–10].
Between 2.9 and 5.8 millions of private as well as institutional users actively exchange tokens and run
the various transaction networks [5]. In May 2017, the market capitalization of active cryptocurrencies
surpassed $91 billion [11]. Bitcoin currently dominates the market but its leading position is challenged
both by technical concerns [12–16] and by the technological improvements of other cryptocurrencies [17].
Despite the theoretical and economic interest of the cryptocurrency market [2, 4, 18, 19], however, a
comprehensive analysis of its dynamics is still lacking. Existing studies have focused either on Bitcoin,
analysing for example the transaction network [20–24] or the behaviour and destiny of its price [9,25–30],
or on a restricted group of cryptocurrencies (typically 5 or 10) of particular interest [5, 17, 31, 32]. But
even in this case there is disagreement as to whether Bitcoin dominant position may be in peril [5] or its
future dominance as leading cryptocurrency is out of discussion [31].
Here we present a first complete analysis of the cryptocurrency market, considering its evolution
between April 2013 and June 2017. We focus on the market shares of the different cryptocurrencies (see
4) and find that Bitcoin has been steadily losing ground to the advantage of the immediate runners-
up. We then show that several statistical properties of the system have been stable for the past few
years, including the number of active cryptocurrencies, the market share distribution, the stability of the
ranking, and the birth and death rate of new cryptocurrencies. We adopt an “ecological” perspective on
the system of cryptocurrencies and notice that several observed distributions are well described by the
so-called “neutral model” of evolution [33,34], which also captures the decrease of Bitcoin market share.
We believe that our findings represent a first step towards a better understanding and modelling of the
cryptocurrency market.
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Figure 1: Evolution of the market capitalization. Evolution of the market capitalization over time
(starting from April 2013), for all cryptocurrencies (blue line,diamonds) and for Bitcoin (red line, dots).
The dashed line is an exponential curve f(t) ∼ eλt, with λ = 0.3, shown as a guide for the eye. Data is
averaged over a 15-week window.
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2 Results
2.1 Market Description
Our analysis focuses on the market share of the different cryptocurrencies and is based on the whole
history of the cryptocurrency market between April 28, 2013 and May 13, 2017. Our dataset includes
1, 469 cryptocurrencies, of which around 600 were active by that time (see 4).
The total market capitalization C of cryptocurrencies has been increasing since late 2015 after a
period of relative tranquillity (Fig. 1). As of May 2017, the market capitalization is more than 4 times
its value compared to May 2016 and it exhibits an exponential growth C ∼ exp(λt) with coefficient
λ = 0.30± 0.02, where t is measured in units of 15 weeks.
2.2 Decreasing Bitcoin Market Share
Bitcoin was introduced in 2009 and followed by a second cryptocurrency (Namecoin, see A.1) only in
April 18, 2011. This first-mover advantage makes Bitcoin the most famous and dominant cryptocurrency
to date. However, recent studies analysing the market shares of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies
reached contrasting conclusions on its current state. While Gandal and Halaburdain in their 2016 study
concluded that “Bitcoin seems to have emerged - at least in this stage - as the clear winner” [35], the
2017 report by Hileman and Rauchs noted that “Bitcoin has ceded significant market cap share to other
cryptocurrencies” [5].
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Figure 2: Evolution of the market share of top-ranking cryptocurrencies. (A) The market
share of Bitcoin across time sampled weekly (gray line) and averaged over a rolling window of 10 weeks
(red line). The dashed line is a linear fit with angular coefficient b = −0.035± 0.002 (the rate of change
in 1 year) and coefficient of determination R2 = 0.63. The Spearman correlation coefficient is ρ = −0.8,
revealing a significant negative correlation at significance level of 1%. (B) Total market share of the top
5 cryptocurrencies excluding Bitcoin sampled weekly (gray line) and averaged over a rolling window of
10 weeks (green line). The dashed line is a linear fit with angular coefficient b = 0.021± 0.002 (the rate
of change in 1 year) and coefficient of determination R2 = 0.45. The Spearman correlation coefficient is
ρ = 0.67, revealing a significant positive correlation at significance level of 1%.
To clarify the situation, we consider the whole evolution of the Bitcoin market share over the past 4
years. Fig. 2A shows that Bitcoin market share has been steadily decreasing for the past years, beyond
oscillations that might mask this trend to short-term investigations. The decrease is well described
by a linear fit f(t) = a + bt with angular coefficient b = −0.035 ± 0.002 representing the change in
market share over t = 1 year. Neglecting the impact of non-linear effects and potential changes in the
competition environment, the model indicates that Bitcoin market share can fluctuate around 50% by
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2025. Conversely, Fig. 2B shows that the top 5 runners-up (see A.1) have gained significant market
shares and now account for more than 20% of the market.
2.3 Stability of the Cryptocurrency Market
In order to characterize the cryptocurrencies dynamics better, we now focus on the statistical properties of
the market. We find that while the relative evolution of Bitcoin and rival cryptocurrencies is tumultuous,
many statistical properties of the market are stable.
Fig. 3A shows the evolution of the number of active cryptocurrencies across time, averaged over a
15-week window. The number of actively traded cryptocurrencies is stable due to similar birth and death
rates since the end of 2014 (Fig. 3B). The average monthly birth and death rates since 2014 are 1.16%
and 1.04%, respectively, corresponding to approximately 7 cryptocurrencies appearing every week while
the same number is abandoned.
Interestingly, the market share distribution remains stable across time. Fig. 4A shows that curves
obtained by considering different periods of time are indistinguishable. This is remarkable because the
reported curves are obtained by considering data from different years as well as data aggregated on
different time spans - from one week to the entire ∼ 4 years of data. The obtained distribution exhibits
a broad tail well described by a power law P (x) ∼ x−α with exponent α = 1.58± 0.12 (Fig.4A), where
the fit coefficient is computed using the method detailed in [36]. The expected relationship between the
probability distribution and the frequency rank distribution predicts the latter is a power-law function
P (r) ∼ r−β with exponent β = 1/(α − 1) [37], yielding in our case β = 1.72 Fig.4B. The empirical fit
coefficient β = 1.93 ± 0.23 is consistent with this prediction. (Fig. 4B). This was also verified for each
year individually (see A.4).
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Figure 3: Evolution of the number of cryptocurrencies. (A) The number of cryptocurrencies that
ever entered the market (filled line) since April 2013, and the number of actively traded cryptocurrencies
(dashed line). (B) The birth and death rate computed across time. The birth (resp. death) rate is
measured as the fraction of cryptocurrencies entering (resp. leaving) the market on a given week over
the number of living cryptocurrencies at that point. Data is averaged over a 15 weeks window.
We further investigate the stability of the market by measuring the average rank occupation time
(Fig. 4C), defined as the amount of time a cryptocurrency typically spends in a given rank before
changing it. We find that the time spent in a top-rank position decays fast with the rank, while for
low-rank positions such time approaches 1 week. Again, this behaviour is stable across years (Fig. 4C
- inset). We also consider the turnover profile defined as the total number of cryptocurrencies ever
occupying rank higher than a given rank in period t (see [38] for a similar definition). Fig. 4D shows
that also this quantity is substantially stable across time.
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Figure 4: Stable properties of the cryptocurrency market. (A) Distribution of market share
computed aggregating across a given year (gray filled lines), and over the week 6-13 May 2017 (blue
thick line). The dashed line is a power law P (x) ∼ x−α curve with exponent α = 1.5. (B) Frequency-
rank distribution of cryptocurrencies, computed aggregating across a given year (gray filled lines), and
over the week 6-13 May 2017 (blue thick line). The dashed line is a power law curve P (r) ∼ r−β
with exponent β = 2. (C) Average amount of time (in weeks) a cryptocurrency occupies a given rank
computed averaging across all years (blue line), and across given years (gray lines, inset). (D) Turnover
of the ranking distribution, defined as the total number of cryptocurrencies ever occupying rank higher
than a given rank. The measure is computed averaging across given years (gray filled lines). The 2013
and 2017 curves must be taken purely as an indication as they are computed on less than 12 months
(approximately 8 and 4 months, respectively). The dashed line has angular coefficient 1, and corresponds
to the case in which the ranking of cryptocurrencies is fixed (i.e., the variable turnover captures only the
initial size of the toplist).
The first rank has been always occupied and continues to be occupied by Bitcoin, while the subsequent
5 ranks (i.e., ranks 2 to 6) have been populated by a total of 33 cryptocurrencies with an average life
time of 12.6 weeks. These values change rapidly when we consider the next set of ranks from 7 to 12 to
reach 70 cryptocurrencies and an average life time of 3.6 weeks. At higher ranks, the mobility increases
and cryptocurrencies continuously change position.
2.4 A Simple Model for the Cryptocurrency Ecology
In order to account for the empirical properties of the dynamics of cryptocurrencies we have discussed
above, we adopt the view of a “cryptocurrency ecology” and consider the neutral model of evolution, a
prototypical model in population-genetics and ecology [33, 34].
The Wright-Fisher model of neutral evolution describes a fixed size population of N individuals where
each individual belongs to one ofm species. At each generation, the N individuals are replaced by N new
individuals. Each new individual belongs to a species copied at random from the previous generation,
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with probability 1 − µ, or to a species not previously seen, with probability µ, where µ is a mutation
parameter that does not change over time [39]. Despite its simplicity, the neutral model is able to
reproduce the static patterns of the competition dynamics of many systems including ecological [40] and
genetics [41] systems, cultural change [42], English words usage [43] and technology patents citations [44].
In our mapping of the ecological model to the cryptocurrency market, each individual corresponds
to a certain amount of dollars, while species correspond to different cryptocurrencies (see A.2). The
copying mechanism represents trading, with µ denoting the probability that a new cryptocurrency is
introduced. Our choice of µ is informed by the data to yield a number of new cryptocurrencies per
unit time corresponding to the empirical observation. We thus fix µ = 7
N
, where N is the population
size in the model. Thus, one model generation corresponds to 1 week of observations, the choice of
µ guaranteeing an average of 7 new cryptocurrencies entering the system every week, as empirically
observed. Finally, in contrast to most neutral models, we assume that a new species does not enter the
system with a single individual but with a size proportional to the empirical average market share of
new cryptocurrency (see A.2).
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Figure 5: Neutral model for evolution and empirical observations. (A) Distribution of cryp-
tocurrencies market shares aggregated over all years (gray line, dots) and the equilibrium distribution
resulting from numerical simulations (blue line, squares) aggregated over 210 generations. The dashed
line is the power law curve P (x) ∼ x−α predicted analytically with exponent α = 1.5 [45]. (B) Turnover
of the ranking distribution computed considering 52 generations for the cryptocurrencies data (gray lines,
dots) and for numerical simulations (blue line), (C) Average number of generations a cryptocurrency
(gray lines) and a species in the neutral model (blue line) occupies a given rank. Averages are computed
across 52 generations. (D) Evolution of the market share of Bitcoin (gray line) and the expected market
share of the first species in numerical simulations (blue line). All simulations are run for N = 105 and
µ = 7/N starting from 1 species in the initial state. The size of entering species m, whose average
m = 15 is informed by the data, is taken at random in the interval m = [10, 20]. Error bars are stan-
dard deviations, computed across 100 simulations. For panels (B) and (C) measures start at generation
g1 = 105 (see A.2 for variations of this parameter).
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The neutral model translates in the simplest way three main assumptions [46]: (i) interactions between
cryptocurrencies are equivalent on an individual per capita basis (i.e., per US dollar); (ii) the process is
stochastic; and (iii) it is a sampling theory, where the new generation is the basis to build the following
one. In other words, the neutral model assumes that all species/cryptocurrencies are equivalent and that
all individuals/US dollars are equivalent.
Testing the consistency between observed patterns of the cryptocurrency market and theoretical
expectations of neutral theory revealed that neutrality captures well at least four features of the cryp-
tocurrency ecology, namely:
1. The exponent of the market share distribution (Fig 5A);
2. The linear behavior of the turnover profile of the dominant cryptocurrencies (Fig 5B);
3. The average occupancy time of any given rank (Fig 5C);
4. The linear decrease of the dominant cryptocurrency (Fig 5D).
The neutral model generates in fact an aggregated species distribution (i.e., obtained when all gener-
ations up to the ith are combined together and analysed as a single population of size N ∗ i [44,47]) that,
at equilibrium, can be described by a power law distribution P (x) ∼ x−α with α = 1.5 [45], in agreement
with the empirical value α = 1.58 ± 0.12 obtained by the fitting procedure described in [36]. Fig. 5A
shows the agreement between simulations and data (same behaviour of the long tail), where simulations
results are aggregated over i = 210 generations, corresponding to 4 years of empirical observations under
our choice of µ. The existence of a power law phase with exponent 1.5 in the model is independent of µ
(see A.2) [45].
Furthermore, when we account for the fact that Bitcoin was originally the only cryptocurrency by
setting 1 species in the initial state, the model captures also the remaining properties. In Fig. 5B and 5C,
we compare the turnover profile and the ranking occupation times with the corresponding simulation
results. We compute these quantities over a period of 52 generations, corresponding to one year of
observations. The curves reported in Figs. 5B and 5C correspond to measures performed between
generation g1 = 105 and g2 = 156, corresponding to year 3 (2015) in the data. Crucially, however, both
measures are stable in time, i.e. they do not depend on the choice of g1 (but for an initial period of
high rank variability for the very first generations, see A.2). It is worth noting that the linearity of
the turnover profile in Fig. 5B corresponds to a similar behaviour observed in [38] when the measure
is performed between two consecutive generations. Fig. 5D shows the observed linear decrease of the
leading cryptocurrency market share (Fig. 5C), indicating that newborn cryptocurrencies mostly damage
the dominating one.
3 Discussion and Outlook
In this paper we have investigated the whole cryptocurrency market between April 2013 and June 2017.
We have shown that the total market capitalization has entered a phase of exponential growth one
year ago, while the market share of Bitcoin has been steadily decreasing. We have identified several
observables that have been stable since the beginning of our time series, including the number of ac-
tive cryptocurrencies, the market-share distribution and the rank turnover. By adopting an ecological
perspective, we have pointed out that the neutral model of evolution captures several of the observed
properties of the market.
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The model is simple and does not capture the full complexity of the cryptocurrency ecology. However,
the good match with at least part of the picture emerging from the data does suggest that some of the
long-term properties of the cryptocurrency market can be accounted for based on simple hypotheses.
In particular, since the model assumes no selective advantage of one cryptocurrency over the other, the
fit with the data shows that there is no detectable population-level consensus on what is the “best”
currency or that different currencies are advantageous for different uses. Furthermore, the matching
between the neutral model and the data implies that the observed patterns of the cryptocurrency market
are compatible with a scenario where technological advancements have not been key so far (see A.3) and
where users and/or investors allocate each packet of money independently. Future work will need to
consider the role of an expanding overall market capitalization and, more importantly, try to include the
information about single transactions, where available, in the modelling picture.
In the immediate and mid-term future, legislative, technical and social advancements will most likely
impact the cryptocurrency market seriously and our approach, together with recent results in compu-
tational social science dealing with the quantification of financial trading and bubble formation [48–51],
could help make sense of the market evolution. In April 2017, for example, Japan started treating Bit-
coin as a legal form of payment driving a sudden increase in the Bitcoin price in US dollars [52] while
in February 2017 a change of regulation in China resulted to a $100 price drop [53]. Similarly, the
exponential increase in the market capitalization (Fig. 1) will likely attract further speculative attention
towards this market while at the same time increasing the usability of cryptocurrencies as a payment
method. While the use of cryptocurrencies as speculative assets should promote diversification [31],
their adoption as payment method (i.e., the conventional use of a shared medium of payment) should
promote a winner-take-all regime [54, 55]. How the self-organized use of cryptocurrencies will deal with
this tension is an interesting question do be addressed in future studies.
4 Material and methods
4.1 Data
Cryptocurrency data was extracted from the website Coin Market Cap [11], collecting weekly data
from 157 exchange markets platforms starting from April 28, 2013 up to May 13, 2017. For all living
cryptocurrencies, the website provides the market capitalization, the price in U.S. dollars and the volume
of trading in the preceding 24 hours. Data on trading volume was collected starting from December 29,
2013.
The website lists cryptocurrencies traded on public exchange markets that are older than 30 days
and for which an API as well as a public URL showing the total mined supply are available. Information
on the market capitalization of cryptocurrencies that are not traded in the 6 hours preceding the weekly
release of data is not included on the website. Cryptocurrencies inactive for 7 days are not included
in the list released. These measures imply that some cryptocurrencies can disappear from the list to
reappear later on.
4.2 Analysis
The following quantities characterize individual cryptocurrencies: The circulating supply is the number
of coins available to users. The price is the exchange rate, determined by supply and demand dynamics.
The market capitalization is the product of the circulating supply and the price. The market share is
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the market capitalization of a currency normalized by the total market capitalization.
Most of our analyses consider the market capitalization and market share of cryptocurrencies. These
quantities neglect the destroyed or dormant coins, accounting for example to 51% of mined Bitcoins
based on data from the period July 18, 2010 to May 13, 2012 [20].
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A Appendix
A.1 some relevant cryptocurrencies
Table 1 provides information on some relevant cryptocurrencies, either occupying high-rank positions or
early introduced in the market. Data was collected in May 2017, see below for details on the Technology
column.
Table 1: Details on the top runner cryptocurrencies in the market. The table is generated
using data collected on May 28, 2013
Name Year Technology Market Cap ($) Rank Additional Info
Bitcoin 2009 Proof-of-work 35B 1
Ethereum 2015 Proof-of-work 15B 2 Smart contracts
Ripple 2013 Distributed open source
consensus ledger
8B 3 Widely adopted by
companies and banks.
NEM 2015 Proof-of-importance 1B 4
Ethereum Classic 2015 Proof-of-work 1B 5 DAO Hard-fork
Litecoin 2011 Proof-of-work 1B 6
Dash 2014 Proof-of-work 809M 7 Gained market since
early 2017. Privacy focused.
Monero 2014 Proof-of-work 535M 8 Gained momentum in late
2016. Privacy focused
NameCoin 2015 Proof-of-work 21M 58
A.2 Simulations
Our choice of the mutation parameter µ is informed by the data to yield a number of new cryptocurrencies
per unit time corresponding to the empirical observation. By choosing µ = 7
N
, where N is the population
size in the model it holds that 1 model generation corresponds to 1 week of observation (since on average 7
new cryptocurrencies enter the system every week, see Sec. 2.3). In Fig. A1 we show that the distribution
of species sizes (see Fig. 5A) has a very similar shape for a broad range of choices of µ [45].
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Figure A1: Distribution of species sizes for different values of µ. Distribution of the species sizes
resulted form numerical simulations given different values of µ.
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All simulations are run starting with one species in order to capture the initial dominance of Bitcoin
in the cryptocurrency market. This reflects the initial state of the cryptocurrencies market, when Bitcoin
was the only existing cryptocurrency. Simulations are run using N = 105, implying that an individual
in the model maps to ∼ $100, 000 (We verified that results do not depend on the choice of N , as long as
N is large enough).
While in the neutral model a new species enters the system as a new individual, we further inform
the model with the average size of a new cryptocurrency (∼ $1.5 million), corresponding to m = 15
individuals in the model when N = 105 as in our case. To consider the fact that new cryptocurrencies
do not enter the market with exactly the same size, in our simulations, when a mutation occurs, the new
species enters with a number m of individuals randomly extracted from the interval [10, 20].
The exponent α = 1.5 exhibited by the data and the simulations(see Fig.5A) are equilibrium proper-
ties of the neutral model, and hence obtained under a broad range of conditions (e.g., initial condition,
time of start of measure and aggregation window) and robust to changes in the value of µ [45], Fig. A1).
Fig.5B and C are obtained starting from generation 104 and aggregating over 52 generations (i.e. per-
forming the analysis over the single population obtained by aggregating the N ∗ 52 individuals [44,47]).
Fig. A2 shows the turnover profile (A) and average life time of a rank (B) when the measure is performed
over 52 generations starting from different generations g1 corresponding to the first year (measures start
at generation g1 = 1), second year (measures start at generation g1 = 53), etc. It is clear that, with
the exception of a high rank mobility characterizing the very first generations, the choice of g1 has little
effect on the curves produced by the model. Fig.5D is measured from generation 1 up to generation 210,
corresponding to 4 years. Each point of the simulation curve corresponds to the instantaneous market
share of the dominating cryptocurrency at that generation.
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Figure A2: Neutral model ranks dynamics. (A) Turnover profile computed considering 52 for the
cryptocurrencies data (gray lines, dots) and for numerical simulations (blue lines). (B) The Average
life time a cryptocurrency/species stays in a given rank computed considering 52 generations for the
cryptocurrencies data (gray lines, dots) and for numerical simulations (blue lines). Simulation parameters
are µ = 7/N , N = 105 and 1 species in the initial state.
A.3 technologies, same distribution
In order to check whether technical differences leave any detectable fingerprint at the level of statistical
distributions, we look at cryptocurrencies adopting one of the two main blockchain algorithms for reaching
consensus on what block represents recent transactions across the network: Proof-of-work (PoW) or the
Proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus algorithms.
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The PoW scheme was introduced as part of Bitcoin in 2009 [1]. To generate new blocks, participating
users work with computational and electrical resources in order to complete “proof-of-works”, pieces of
data that are difficult to produce but easy to verify. Block generation (also called “mining”) is rewarded
with coins. To limit the rate at which new blocks are generated, every 2016 blocks the difficulty of the
computational tasks changes [56].
While the PoW mechanism is relatively simple, there are concerns regarding its security and sustain-
ability. First, severe implications could arise from the dominance of mining pools controlling more than
50% of the computational resources and who could in principle manipulate the blockchain transactions.
This scenario is far from being unrealistic: in 2014, one mining pool (Ghash.io) [57] controlled 42% of the
Bitcoin mining power. Also, the energy consumption of PoW based blockchain technologies has raised
environmental concerns: it is estimated that Bitcoin consumes about 12.76 TWh per year [58].
The PoS scheme was introduced as an alternative to PoW. In this system, mining power is not
attributed based on computational resources but on the proportion of coins held. Hence, the richer
users are more likely to generate the next block. Miners are rewarded with the transactions fees. While
proof-of-work relies heavily on energy, proof-of-stake doesn’t suffer from this issue. However, consensus
is not guaranteed since miners sole interest is to increase their profit. Through the years both protocols
have been altered to fix certain issues and continue to be improved.
Figure A3 shows that the market shares of the two groups of cryptocurrencies follow the same
behavior. The figure is generated using data collected from [59] and [11].
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Figure A3: Distribution of market share. Distribution of the market share for proof-of-work
cryptocurrencies (light blue filled line) and distribution of market share of (proof-of-stake or hybrid)
cryptocurrencies (dark blue filled line). The dashed line is power law curve with exponent α = 1.5.
A.4 share and frequency-rank distributions for individual years
The power-law fit for the distribution of market share (Table 2) and the frequency-rank distribution (Ta-
ble 3) are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the neutral model [37] also for individual years.
Fits coefficient for the distribution of market share are computed using the methodology described in [36]
(errors are obtained by bootstrapping 1000 times). Fit coefficients with errors for frequency-rank distri-
butions are computed with the least-square method.
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Table 2: Power-law fit coefficients of the market share distributions.
Year α
2013 1.37± 0.04
2014 1.54± 0.09
2015 1.62± 0.12
2016 1.59± 0.13
2017 1.60± 0.21
all years 1.58± 0.12
Table 3: Power-law fit coefficients of the frequency-rank distributions.
Year β
2013 −1.98± 0.20
2014 −2.00± 0.13
2015 −1.83± 0.08
2016 −1.88± 0.08
2017 −1.86± 0.16
all years −1.93± 0.23
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